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.ABSTRACT 
Some economists have argued that of fsetting effects on risk and 
return may make capital income taxes nondistorting. This paper 
performs three tasks. First, the conditions under which the argument 
is true are studied in an asset pricing model that unlike earlier 
models allows the timing of depreciation deductions to vary and 
incorporates the effectiveness and distribution of government 
expenditures. One result is that it is plausible that the 
nondistortion result holds regardless of that timing or of the 
distribution and effectiveness of expenditures if the pre-tax riskless 
rate is zero. 
A second task concerns the cases where the pre-tax riskless 
rate is not negligible and the nondistortion result does not hold. 
Then the degree and pattern of distortion depends on the general 
equilibrium impact of taxes and expenditures on average risk aversion 
and on the pre-tax riskless rate. An interesting result emerges 
concerning the impact of the timing of depreciation allowances. When 
average risk aversion stays constant, the conventionally expected 
effect that faster write-offs result in more investment will occur if 
and only if the pre-tax riskless rate falls when timing is accelerated. 
This is true because in the absence of any change in the pre-tax 
riskless rate, changes in depreciation timing cause changes in risk and 
expected return that exactly off set each other. 
Finally, the paper shows that the failure to add a premium for 
"capital risk" to the standard economic depreciation allowance based on 
expected decline in asset value does not change that result unless the 
income tax system has the pathology of allowing used asset sales to be 
tax free. The current U.S. tax system seems to be free of that 
pathology. 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
The Taxation of Risky Investments :  
An Asset Pricing Approach 
Jeff Strnad 
Over the past few years , several economists have studied the 
taxation of income from risky capital investments using asset pricing 
models .  Striking conclusions have emerged from two of those studies . 
Gordon ( 1981 ) argues that taxation of income from risky investment has 
two opposing effects . First. taxation of such income lowers the 
expected return from the investments therefore making them less 
attractive .  Second , the government shares i n  the income and losses 
from the investments and thus absorbs some of the risk of the 
investments . To the extent of the reduction in risk the investments 
are more attractive to investors . Gordon argues that these two 
effects are "largely offsetting" so that taxes on income from capital 
leave "investment incentives basically unaffected, despite the sizable 
tax revenues collected . "  
Bulow and Summers ( 1984) argue that although taxation of the 
income from capital reduces the risk with respect to the income , it 
does not reduce the risk involved with the value of the capital. As 
an empirical matter , this latter risk , "capital risk, " appears to be 
large compared to the former risk . "income risk . "  As a result,  Bulow 
and Summers conclude that the negative effects of taxes on the 
expected rate of investment return are not fully offset by the 
reduction in risk due to taxation since most of the risk is "capital 
risk . "  They also argue that for a depreciation allowance given ex 
ante to be equivalent to economic depreciation given ex post the 
allowance should not be merely the expected decline in value of the 
asset . A premium should be added that compensates the investor for 
capital risk . Use of a depreciation rate consisting of expected 
decline in value plus this premium reestablishes the Gordon effect : 
the negative effect of taxes on expected rate of return will be 
approximately fully offset by a corresponding reduction in risk . 
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After examining the results in the two papers in more detail 
in part II, this paper performs three tasks . First , a portion of 
section III determines the conditions required for Gordon ' s  result to 
be true . Despite the intuitive appeal of his idea, the models in 
Gordon ( 1 981 ) have unnecessarily severe limitations . He derives his 
results in two ways: an intuitive argument based on the capital asset 
pricing model ( "CAPH")  and a rigorous argument based on a two-period 
consumption model . The result of his two-period consumption model is 
that income taxes have no effect on investment or consumption if the 
tax revenues are distributed lump-sum when collected. One important 
innovation in this model is that the model accounts for the 
expenditure of tax revenues .  Gordon himself notes that the earlier 
writers on the effects of taxes on risk bearing "almost all assume 
that individuals no longer bear what risk is passed on to the 
government . "  Unfortunately, as shown in the Appendix to this paper . 
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when his two-period consumption model is simplified to a single-level 
tax on income from capital in a non-inflationary world, this result is 
a consequence of each taxpayer knowing that he or she will receive 
back exactly the taxes he or she will  pay . In addition, the intuitive 
arguments based on the CAPH turn out to be significantly qualified 
when that model is applied rigorously to gauge the effect of taxes on 
asset prices as this paper does in part III. 
The CAPH-based approach in part III differs from Gordon 's  
approach in  two fundamental ways . First, some of the limitations in 
his two-period consumption model are removed by providing a much 
richer model of government expenditure. The distribution of 
expenditure benefits is a variable, and there is a variable 
representing the anticipated total effectiveness of expenditures. 
This second variable allows for the fact that individuals may 
anticipate total government expenditure benefits to be more or less 
valuable than the benefits from spending the same total dollars 
privately . The "more" case might arise where the government spends to 
provide goods more efficiently than the private sector can. The 
"less" case includes the situation where government spending is at 
least partially "wasteful " as well as the situation where individuals 
myopically ignore government expenditure wholly or in part. 
The second fundamental way in which the model of part III 
differs from Gordon ' s  approach is that explicit allowance is made for 
the timing of depreciation deductions . Traditionally, this timing has 
been considered to have a potentially very important impact on 
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investment incentives. In Gordon 's  models depreciation deductions are 
delayed until the end of the final period . An important issue is 
whether this delay affects his result .  Finally, if  some depreciation 
deductions are allowed before taxes on profits are levied , the 
government must fund the ensuing revenue loss.  In the model in part 
III this is done explicitly by government borrowing against future tax 
payments . 
What emerges from part III is that Gordon ' s  result depends on 
two parameters.  One is a measure of changes in average risk aversion 
due to taxes and expenditures . The second is a measure of the 
difference between the riskless rate in the world with no taxes and 
the pre-tax riskless rate in the world with taxes . Changes in average 
risk aversion arise from the wealth effects of the tax and expenditure 
package and affect Gordon ' s  results by changing risk premia. The 
intuition is straightforward . Suppose, for example ,  that people 
anticipate that government expenditure benefits will be more valuable 
than private expenditure of the tax revenues . This makes people feel 
wealthier and , under standard assumptions about behavior under 
uncertainty, makes them less risk averse . The market risk premium 
demanded for a given risk therefore falls. This phenomenon is in 
addition to the effect of taxes of absorbing part of the risk in 
investment since the government shares in gains and losses . If this 
second effect by itsel f cancels out the disincentive to investment 
from the drop in rate of return caused by taxes, adding the first 
effect may cause risky investment to increase over no tax world 
s 
levels . 
Despite the potential for wealth effects to change Gordon ' s  
results , his results are plausible i f  one assumes the real pre-tax 
riskless rate of return to be negligible.  This assumption has some 
empirical support . Ibbotson and Sinquefield ( 1 977) , for example ,  find 
that the average real pre-tax return on U . S. Treasury bills 
(presumably nearly riskless )  has been about 0.2 percent , while the 
average risk premium in the stock market has been about 9 percent . 
that : 
The implications of pre-tax riskless rate being negligible are 
( 1 )  the net present value of tax revenues,  and thus of 
expenditure,  is negligible; 
( 2 )  asset prices remain nearly the same in the world with taxes 
as in the no tax world; 
( 3 )  the effect on investment incentives is negligible.  
These implications follow independent of  the timing of  depreciation 
allowances. The first two implications ensure that wealth effects can 
be neglected. As a consequence, the third implication, Gordon 's  main 
resul t ,  holds true . Finally, note that implications ( 1 )  and ( 3 )  go 
together : although taxes have little effect on investment incentives ,  
the net present value of tax revenues is also negligible .  This 
confirms one argument in Bulow and Summers (1984 ) : the lack of 
investment disincentives in Gordon ( 1 981) is not accompanied by the 
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"free lunch" of substantial tax revenues . 
This set of implications is no longer plausible if the pre-tax 
riskless rate is nontrivial . A real pre-tax riskless rate of even one 
or two percent will result in tax revenues with substantial net 
present value and in substantial potential effects on investment 
incentives . This leads to the second task of this paper : a study of 
the effect of taxes on investment incentives when Gordon' s  result does 
not apply.  Proposition 1 in part III shows that taxes impact on 
investment incentives only if taxes either change average risk 
aversion or make the pre-tax riskless rate differ from the no tax 
world riskless rate . The effect of changes in average risk aversion 
and in the pre-tax riskless rate may depend on asset characteristics . 
For example ,  if average risk aversion is unchanged but the pre-tax 
riskless rate rises so that the after-tax riskless rate equals the no 
tax world riskless rate , then riskier assets experience more of a 
disincentive effect from taxes . 
Many different conclueions about incentive affects can be 
obtained depending upon what one postulates about the impact of taxes 
on average risk aversion and on the pre-tax riskless rate. One 
important area in which the model creates new insi ghts is in the 
perennial dispute about the impact of the timing of depreciation 
deductions on investment . Timing differences may affect average risk 
aversion through various wealth effects . These wealth effects occur 
because accelerating depreciation deductions means that the government 
must spend more of the net present value of tax revenues to fund those 
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deductions than on other expenditures . There is no a priori direction 
of the effects: accelerating deductions may increase , decrease or not 
affect average risk aversion depending on the effectiveness of 
government expenditure and on its distribution. 
According to Proposition 2 in part III, in the absence of 
changes in average risk aversion the conventionally expected effects 
of timing can occur only if the acceleration of deductions reduces the 
required pre-tax riskless rate below the riskless rate in the no tax 
world. That reduction would cause all security prices to rise in the 
same proportion so that investing in physical assets and then selling 
ownership of the assets in securities markets would be more lucrative. 
Proposition 2 has a striking corollary. If the economy-wide pre-tax 
riskless rate of return is unaffected by the timing of depreciation 
deductions for investments, then the timing pattern has no effect on 
investment incentives . This is true even in cases where the after-tax 
riskless rate varies greatly with the timing pattern. 
The intuition behind this can be made clearer by considering 
two polar cases : "expensing" and "recovery at retirement . "  Assume 
that average risk aversion is the same in both cases.  This allows a 
focus on the conventional effects of timing through the pre-tax 
riskless rate . "Expensing" is where there is an immediate 1 0 <1'  
write-off for investment. "Recovery at retirement" allows no write­
off until the investment asset is sold or abandoned as worthless.  
Expensing in effect amounts to  government purchase of the 
proportion T (where T is the tax rate) of any asset at the same cost 
as the taxpayer bears. The government then obtains the proportion T 
of all gains and losses.  The investor effectively owns the portion 
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( 1  - T) of the asset and receives the pre-tax rate of return tax free 
on that portion. With recovery at retirement the government does not 
purchase part of the asset at the outset .  Instead , it  simply takes 
part of the returns at the end and properly accounts for costs at that 
time. Both risk and expected return are reduced from pre-tax l evels .  
But the pre-tax rate of return i s  the same as i n  the case o f  expensing 
so long as the pre-tax riskless rate is not affected by timing 
changes . ( Pre-tax risk premia can be shown to be independent of 
timing regime so long as the pre-tax riskless rate and average risk 
aversion are ) . As a result ,  the basic Gordon effect makes recovery at 
retirement equivalent to expensing: the reduction in risk exactly 
compensates for the reduction in rate of return. In order for more 
rapid depreciation to increase the incentive to invest the economy­
wide pre-tax riskless rate must fall .  
The third and final task of this paper is  a critique of 
arguments in Bulow and Summers ( 1984 ) . These arguments , if correct,  
would greatly alter the results discussed so far. Furthermore, Bulow 
and Summers ' notion that ex ante depreciation should include a premium 
for capital risk has considerable intuitive appeal . Unfortunately , 
their resul t is based on the unstated assumption that the gains and 
losses from the sale of used assets will be ignored by the tax system . 
If gains from such sales are taxed and losses from such sales are 
deductible, as is the case under current U . S. tax law, then the 
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government does share in the capital risk element at the time of s ale. 
Not surprisingly, in this case the Bulow and Summers result 
disappears . On the other hand, if the owner never finds it profitable 
to sell used assets , the capital risk never materializes . It is only 
in the case where for some reason sales of used assets are exempted 
from tax that the Bulow and Summers notion that depreciation 
allowances should carry a risk premium is applicable .  In effect , such 
a risk premium "corrects" for a defect in the tax system and is not 
appropriate in an income tax system such as the current U . S. system 
that does not have the defect . 
Section IV of this article establishes these points using a 
simple discounted present value analysis . Before doing that or 
constructing the asset pricing model in section III, section II makes 
the arguments and approach in the previous literature more precise . 
II. PRIOR ARGUMENTS AND APPROACHES 
The CAPM analysis in Gordon ( 1 981 ) and all of the analysis in 
Bulow and Summers ( 1984 ) gauges the effect of taxes on investment 
incentives by comparing the required r ate of return in the no-tax 
world to the required pre-tax rate of return in the tax world. The 
idea is that if there are no general equilibrium effects on pre-tax 
operating profits and costs , there will be no change in the incentive 
to invest if these r ates remain the same. On the other hand , if the 
required pre-tax r ate of return in the tax world substantially exceeds 
the required rate of return in the no-tax world,  then taxes make some 
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investments nonviable that would be profitable in  a world without 
taxes . 
Suppose that in a no tax world an additional marginal unit of 
asset j returns revenues ( net  of operating costs except depreciation) 
at an expected rate fj during a particular period and depreciates in 
value at rate dj during that period . The required minimum expected 
r ate of return for this project will consist of the sum of two 
quantities . First , there is the riskless rate of return, r ' , that 
investors require in order to invest in projects with revenues and 
costs not subject to uncertainty . Second , there is a premium, aj ' '  
that reflects the additional increment in rate of return required to 
compensate for the fact that the actual revenues and costs for the 
period are uncertain. In the no tax world , then, a marginal 
investment will have the property that 
fj - dj = r '  + aj' .  
I·�·· the expected revenues net of costs including depreciation are 
equal to the minimal expected rate of return that investors will 
require for a project with those risk characteristics . 
When an "income tax" at rate T on net profits during that 
( 1 )  
period i s  added , Gordon ( 1 981 ) argues that a marginal investment will 
have the following property : 
<fj - dj) ( l  - Tl = r '  + aj' (l - T). ( 2 )  
e I·�·· profits, fj - dj' are taxed at rate T, the risk premium is 
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reduced to reflect the fact that the government has absorbed lOOT 
percent of the risk , but investors require a riskless return of r '  
after-� i n  order t o  invest . 
In section III, I will examine the argument for reducing a '  by 
the factor ( 1  - T) , but leaving r '  the same. In the rest of this 
section that approach , common to both Gordon ( 1981 ) and Bulow and 
Summers ( 1 984 ) , will be assumed to be correct . Gordon ' s  basic 
argument can be seen by rearranging ( 2 )  to obtain:  
e 1 fj - dj = � r' + aj ' .  ( 3 )  
The right hand side of  (3 )  is 1 � T r '  more than the right hand side 
of ( 1 ) . Thus , due to taxes investors require an increase by that 
amount in the no tax rate of return. Thus, projects with returns 
between r '  + aj ' and 1 : T r• + aj • will not be undertaken in the tax 
world although they are in the no tax world .  In this simplified 
version, Gordon 's  thesis relies on the presumption that 1 � T r '  is 
very small compared to r '  + aj ' so that not much change in investment 
behavior results from the income tax . This presumption is reasonable 
given that empirical evidence strongly suggests that r' would be 
negligible compared to aj ' for the average stock market asset.  
Bulow and Summers ' argument relies on the assumption that none 
of the capital risk is absorbed by the government and that capital 
risk far exceeds income risk . In the framework above they present the 
core of their argument by assuming that all of the risk in the 
investment is capital risk . Since there is no income risk , revenues 
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net of all costs except depreciation are certain and for asset j can 
e be represented by using fj , now a constant , instead of fj
. Bulow and 
Summers make the point that in a real world tax system depreciation is 
set ex ante, 1.� . .  before the actual decline in asset value is known. 
There is some amount of actual depreciation that will occur. This 
amount is known only ex post and usually is called "economic 
depreciation. " Traditionally, the best ex ante approximation of 
economic depreciation has been taken to be the expected amount of 
depreciation. For asset j call this amount dj (rather than dj ) .  
Now since risk is not reduced due to taxes , the after-tax 
equation changes from ( 2 )  to the following: 
( fj - d� ) ( l  - T) = r '  + aj ' .  ( 4) 
Thus , the minimum before-tax rate of return required by investors is 
1 : T( r '  + aj ' )  which is 1 : T( r '  + aj ' )  larger than ( r '  + aj ' ) ,  the 
minimum rate of return required by investors in the no tax world. 
Bulow and Summers argue that since aj ' is large, ( r '  + aj ' )  is not 
negligible .  As  a result ,  a tax will cause a si gnificant reduction in 
investment in risky assets . 
One of Bulow and Summers major theses is that the best ex ante 
approximation of economic depreciation for asset j would consist of 
dj + aj ' • expected depreciation for the period plus the risk premium 
that investors would demand with respect to the risk that actual 
depreciation will differ from d� . With that amount of depreciation J 
allowance equation ( 4) becomes: 
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e ( fj - dj - aj ' ) ( l - T) = r ' . (5) 
This gives a result similar to Gordon 's  in that ( 5 )  is almost 
identical to ( 2) .  In particular, the pre-tax return must increase by 
1 � T r '  over the return i n  the no tax world to compensate i nvestors 
for the effects of taxation. Thus, if depreciation of dj + aj ' is 
used, the tax on capital income will have very little effect on 
investment behavior . 
III. AN ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
The literature discussed in part II tests the incentive 
effects of taxes on investment by comparing the required rate of 
return in the no-tax world to the required pre-tax rate of return in  
the tax world. This part makes the same comparison but makes it 
through a rigorous asset pricing model. Section A sets up a model and 
gives special attention to the treatment of government expenditures , 
to the timing of taxes and deductions and to government budget 
constrai nts .  Section B derives as equation ( 42 )  the difference 
between the pre-tax and no tax required rates of return. Section C 
discusses the implications of that equation and of some of the other 
results i n  section B .  
A.  The Model 
In order to analyze the separate effects of income taxes on  
the riskless rate of return and on  risk premia, it  is convenient to 
use the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM that includes a riskless 
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asset .  The framework used here is  similar to  that of Brennan ( 1 970) . 
There are m risk averse investors (indexed by i) who select portfolios 
of securities with a single-period horizon. There are n + 1 
securities ( indexed by j) in the economy . The asset labelled j = 0 is 
riskless, and the other n securities ( j  = l, • • •  , n) are risky . Take 
the total number of shares in each security to be fixed during the 
period . Define Pj as the value per share of security j at the 
beginning of the period in a world with taxes on income from capital. 
Let Pj• be the value per share of security j at the beginning of the 
period in a world with no taxes on income from capital. The value of 
security j at the end of the period in the no tax world is a random 
variable gj. Finally, gj is also the pre-tax terminal value of 
security j in the world with taxes . The paradigm here is of a return 
of gj at the end of the period to an asset that is priced differently 
at the beginning of the period under different tax regimes . Denote by 
gj the expected value of gj and let sjk = cov( gj,gk) .  
The basic model is completed with the following assumptions: 
(Al) Individual preferences are characterized by von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions that are monotone increasing 
strictly concave functions of after-tax end of period wealth . 
( A2 )  The returns on  securities are distributed multivariate 
normal. 
( A3 )  Individuals are price takers and have homogeneous 
expectations about gj and sjk for all j, k. 
(A4 ) There are no transactions costs , no restrictions on 
borrowing and no restrictions on short sales of securities . 
(AS )  All assets are marketable.  
(A6) At both the beginning of the period and the end of the 
period , all owners face the same marginal tax rate T and full 
loss offsets are available.  
lS 
(A7) When trading ends at the beginning of the period each owner 
of asset j receives a depreciation deduction of DPj per share . 
This deduction has immediate effect so that given full loss 
offsets it is equivalent to a cash payment of TDPj per share from 
the government to each owner of asset j when trading ends . Since 
the proportion D of the asset cost has been deducted at the 
beginning of the period, only the proportion (1 - D) may be 
deducted in calculating gains at the end of the period . End of 
period gains for tax purposes are thus gj - (1 - D ) Pj per share 
or (1 - T ) (gj - (1 - D ) Pj) after tax . 
(AS) The price of the riskless asset in the no-tax world is one . 
J..�. • Po ' = 1 .  
(A9 )  Define G as  the beginning-of-period net present value of 
tax revenues minus the cost the government incurs to cover 
beginning-of-period depreciation allowances .  Individual i 
anticipates that expenditures will benefit him or her by diE 
m 
times G where f" di= 1 .  J..� . •  expenditures will have an effect f:=1 
equivalent to distributing diE times G lump-sum to i at the 
beginning of the period . 
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Assumptions (Al) and (A2) imply that preferences in a model of 
optimal portfolio choice can be described by a utility function over 
the mean and variance of after-tax wealth .  See Baron (197 7 ) . 
Assumptions (All through (AS )  taken together are a standard set of 
assumptions for the CAPH with a riskless asset.  See Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (197 9 ) . Assumptions (A6)  and (A7)  imply that there is a 
single-level tax <1.� . .  no tax at an entity level added to individual 
taxes ) ,  no special rate on capital gains, no realization requirement 
as a trigger to taxation, and no progressivity in rates . 1 
The variable D captures the timing of depreciation deductions. 
When D = 1 ,  the asset is "expensed . "  The owner receives a full 
deduction of asset cost in advance of any decline in value . When 
D = 0 ,  the owner must wait unt 1l the end of the period to deduct any 
portion of the asset cost . If the asset is expected to decline in 
value over the period so that the before-tax portion of gj that 
represents residual asset value is less than Pj' then the standard 
analysis would suggest that some D such that O < D < 1 would result in 
a time 0 depreciation deduction equal to the present value of the 
expected decline in asset value . Of course , it is this method of 
setting depreciation allowances that Bulow and Summers (1984) suggest 
results in inadequate deductions. Nonetheless, various values of D 
represent various alternatives for the timing of depreciation 
al 1 owances . 
The CAPH gives only the relative prices of the n + 1 
securities under each tax regime. Since we want to see whether and 
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how the effect of taxes on the riskless rate relates to the effect of 
taxes on risk premia, the model is solved with a parameter b 
specifying the relation between riskless rates . The riskless asset 
returns g0 before taxes (regardless of tax regime) at the end of the 
period . In the no tax world the riskless asset price is set at one by 
assumption (A8)  so that the return per share of riskless asset is 
r' = g0 - 1. Let the riskless asset be priced at 
Po 
g0b(l - T) 
g0 - 1 + b(l - T) 
(6) 
in a tax world with tax rate T so that in that world the pre-tax 
riskless rate of return is 
r '  r = b(l- T) " (7) 
In Bulow and Summers (1984 ) and Gordon (1981 ) b = 1 is the assumption. 
J.� . .  the pre-tax riskless rate of return in the tax world rises just 
enough from the no-tax riskless rate of return so that , r(l - T) , the 
after-tax riskless rate of return when D = 0 ,  equals the no-tax 
riskless rate of return. Summers (1981 ) justifies this assumption 
principally by the argument that if the U.S. corporate capital stock 
is the focus , this capital stock is small compared to the world 
capital stock available for investment so that the after-tax riskless 
rate of return can be assumed to be given exogenously. 
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Assumption (A9 )  treats gover rnent expenditures through the 
summary statistic, G. G represents net government revenues that will 
be spent during the period or distributed at the end of the period . 
If an individual anticipates benefiting from such expenditures or 
distributions , it is as if the individual is given an additional 
security representing the right to those benefits at the beginning of 
the period. Government revenues are simply a slice of asset returns. 
Since there are no short sale restrictions, each individual can 
realize the wealth increment inherent in his or her expenditure 
benefits by taking the appropriate short positions. Thus , it is 
reasonable to summarize government expenditures by adding a portion of 
the net present value of tax revenues to each individual 's endowment 
at the beginning of the period. 
Assumption (A9 )  specifies a set of homogeneous beliefs about 
the efficacy of government expenditures through E and about the 
distributional impact of those expenditures through the di. Thus , 
m 
r- di = 1 so that the di indicate how the expenditure benefits are �1 
divided. E can be thought of as the anticipated constant marginal 
effectiveness of government expenditure. When E = 1 ,  individual s view 
government expenditure as equivalent to lump-sum distribution of the 
full amount of tax revenues with individual i receiving the proportion 
di. When E = 0 ,  individuals ei ther myopically ignore government 
expenditures or value the expenditures at zero. 
Intuition might suggest that the marginal effectiveness of 
expenditures would decline with the total amount of expenditure. 
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Furthermore,  a rational welfare-maximizing government would spend only 
to the point where E = 1 .  Nonetheless, it greatly simplifies the 
model to take E to be constant. and the results are still quite rich . 
In addition, E � 1 is realistic under certain views of government 
functioning . For example, the government may "overspend" in response 
to politicians who are maximizing the probability of reelection as 
described in Fiorina (1977 ) . In that case E < 1. Conversely,  if the 
government buys public goods with its revenues, there may be 
substantial unsatisfied demand for such goods due to the inability of 
the political process to charge costs to the true beneficiaries . 
E > 1 will be the resul t .  
T o  complete the model , i t  i s  necessary to specify government 
financial behavior . The government receives revenues at the end of 
the period but must pay the after-tax value of depreciation allowances 
at the beginning of the period . There is an additional problem. A 
traditional approach, adopted here, is to take the net expenditure 
amount G to be fixed and set in advance under each tax regime. But 
revenues are risky and may turn out to be higher or lower than 
expected if total gains at the end of the period are higher or lower 
than expected . In fact , under assumption (A2) about the returns on 
securities , end of period losses might exceed end of period gains so 
that revenues may be negative at that time . 
The problem of paying for the after-tax value of depreciation 
all owances at the beginning of the period is easy to handle within the 
model . The government can borrow or sell short against its end-of-
20 
period tax revenues to raise the money for the payments .  However, 
this will change the securities comprising the private market at the 
beginning of the period, and market-clearing prices may depend on the 
pattern of government borrowing and short sales. The possibility of a 
"shortfall"  or "surplus" in revenues at the end of the period is 
harder . In a one period model it is inappropriate to assume that this 
will be handled by running a government deficit or surplus at the end 
of the period . The effects of such a policy extend into later 
periods . Another solution is to assume that the government will levy 
additional taxes at the end of the period if there is a revenue 
"shortfall"  and will distribute any excess revenues if there is a 
"surplus . "  The result will be to force certain individuals to own 
securities representing the risk of a shortfall or surplus . Unless 
they are myopic ,  these individuals will adjust their portfolios at the 
beginning of the period in anticipation. Thus, the additional taxes 
and distributions required at the end of the period to balance the 
government ' s  budget may affect security prices at the beginning of the 
period . 
Fortunately,  there is an easy way to model both the 
requirement that the government pay the after-tax value of beginning­
of-period depreciation allowances and the need to take into account 
the additional end-of-period taxes and distributions required to 
balance the budget. The end-of-period taxes and distributions make 
government revenues riskless . The government transfers the downside 
and upside to private parties . Exactly the same effect would result 
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if the government engaged in a pattern of short sales at the beginning 
of the period that eliminated the riskiness from its "portfolio" 
consisting of revenues and the short positions. Private traders would 
perceive exactly the same increase in the supply of securities to the 
market from those short sales as they would from the government 
announcing at the beginning of the period the pattern of distributions 
and taxes it will engage in at the end of the period to balance the 
budget. Given no restrictions on individual short sales, it does not 
matter whether the governnent explicitly engages in short sales at the 
beginning of the period or "creates" the same set of securities by 
announcing end-of-period taxes and distributions. Any distributional 
differences between the two schemes can be eliminated by imposing 
beginning-of-period transfers between individuals that create the same 
initial wealth distribution as the announcement of the taxes and 
distributions would. 
More formally suppose that there are x� total shares of 
security j. The government buys a portfolio during trading at the 
beginning of the period. This portfolio is represented by 
<a0, a1, • • • •  an)' where aj is the proportion of total shares xj sold 
short by the government. Thus, private market traders have (1 + aj>xj 
shares of security j available to them during the trading at the 
beginning of the period. Prices in private markets must adjust such 
that there is no excess demand or supply with that total number of 
shares rather than the lower number xj. The government chooses its 
portfolio such that 
(1) both upside and downside tax revenue risk is eliminated by 
tranafering it to private parties; 
and (2) short sales and borrowing at the beginning of the period 
completely cover payouts required on depreciation allowances. 
It is straightforward to specify both the portfolio required 
to satisy these two conditions and G, the net present value of 
government expenditures other than "expenditure" to cover beginning-
of-period depreciation allowances. At the end of the period the 
goverruent will receive revenues in the amount 
n 
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Qt T�0<gJ - (1 - D) PJ ) (l + aJ>xj. ( 8 )  
The income that is taxed per share is gj - (1 - D)PJ instead of 
gj - PJ since the taxpayer's basis in the shares is reduced by DPJ' 
the depreciation allowance at the beginning of the period. The amount 
(1 + aj>xj is the total shares of security j held by the private 
sector. At the end of the period, the government must pay 
Qs 
n �0gJajxJ ( 9) 
on its short positions so that net revenues will be 
Q Qt - Qs = 
n o o �
l
gj(T(l + aj) - aj) xj + g0(T(l + a0) - a0) x0 
n 
- T(l - D )  �OPj(l + aj> xj . 
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( 10) 
Since returns are normally distributed, the possibility of Q being 
risky can be ruled out only if the coefficients of gj in the first 
term of (10 ) are all zero.2 This requires that 
a - T j 1=T for j 1, 2, • . .  , n. ( 11) 
Now suppose that the government sets a0 such that payments on 
its short positions exactly equal tax revenues. This amounts to 
solving (10 ) for a0 given (11) and Q = 0. Now using the fact that 
g0 - P0 = rP0 we obtain 
-(1 T � o o - D ) l - T Pjxj + T(r + D)Poxo 0 =1 PoXo«o = 1 + r(l - T) - DT 
Now the government receives at time O the amount 
n 
fa p o 
J=o j j
xj 
T(r + D) n o 
1 + r(l - T) - DT;OPjxj 
(12) 
(13) 
in revenues from short sales that represent the value of all future 
n 
tax revenues. The government must pay DT;0Pjxj< 1 + aj) in after-tax 
depreciation benefits at the beginning of the period . Subtracting 
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this from (13) yields G: 
G TrCl - D) 
n o 
1 + r(l - T )  - DT;0Pjxj. (14) 
B. The Effect of Taxes on the Riskless Rate and Risk Premia 
This section uses the model to compute the impact of income 
taxes on the required rate of return. The result is stated as 
equation (42 ) .  Several relations developed as steps to that result 
express the impact of taxes on the riskless rate and on risk premia. 
These relations are of interest independent of equation (42 ) ,  and 
section C discusses them. 
If vi is the random after-tax return of investor i's portfolio 
and S� the variance of that return, then the following equations 
describe vi (the expected value of vi) and S� : 
n 
vi = �l [gj(l - Tl + (1 - D)TPj]xij 
s: 1 
+ [r(l - T) + (1 - DT) ]P0xiO 
n n 
�
lk�l sjkxijxik(l - T) 2 
( 15) 
(16) 
where individual i holds xij shares of security j at the end of the 
period, and there are x� shares in total of security j. 3 The 
- 2 individual investor maximizes Ui(vi, Si) subject to a budget 
constraint: 
f 0 0 
J=1
Pj(xij(l - DT ) - xij ) + Po< xiO(l - DT) - xiO ) - EdiG = 0 (17) 
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where x�j denotes i's initial holdings in shares of security j. 
The ultimate goal is to compare security prices (and thus 
required rates of return) in the tax world to those in the no tax 
world. A first step is to allow portfolio adjustment consistent with 
individual maximization. The resulting equations will then be subject 
to market clearing conditions. 
Form the Lagrangean: 
2 Li = Ui(vi' Si) 
n 
A [�
1
Pj(xij(l - DT) - x�j) 
+ Po<xiO(l - DT) - X�o> - EdiG]. 
The first order conditions are the following: 
and 
aLi av. -- = U __ 1 axiO il ax 
- APO(l - DT) 
aLi 
axij 
iO 
u 
� as2 
i1 ax + u. - -�i iJ 12 ax. ij 
0 
APj(l - DT) 0 for j f. 
O 
where Uin is the first partial derivative with respect to the nth 
argument of Ui. 
4 Furthermore, it is true that: 
avi 
• { !dl - Tl • (1 - DTllP0 
ax -ij gj(l - Tl + (1 - D)TPj 
for j = 0 
for j f. 0 
2 asi 
{o for j = 0 
axij n 2 2 L s .kxik(l - T) 
1=1 J 
for j f. 0. 
( 18) 
( 19) 
(20) 
( 21) 
(22) 
Substituting (21) and (22) into (19) and (20) and simplifying yields 
for each j ' 1: 
n 
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r s x 
if=1 jk ik 
i_(g - (1 + r)Pj) (1 - Tl j (23) 
where wi = -ui1/2Ui2 is proportional to the marginal rate of 
substitution of investor i between portfolio expected return and 
portfolio variance. Combined with the budget constraint (17), for a 
given i the n equations in <23) yield n + 1 equations in the n + 1 
unknowns xij (j = 1, • • •  , n). Under assumption (Al) of price-taking 
behavior by investor i, these equations determine the xij for all j. 
Market clearing requires the following: 
�
l
xij = (1 + aj)x� (241 
where x� is the total number of shares of security j. Summing both 
sides of (23) over the m investors yields an aggregate equation: 
f 8 0 if=1 jkxk 
m �
1
wi(gj - (1 + r)Pj> .  (251 
since 1 + aj = 1/(1 - Tl for j 2 1. 
Make the following definitions. Rj = (gj - Pjl /Pj is the rate 
n 
of return on security j. W = [ Pkx� is the total market value of all K=l 
securities at the beginning of the period and Pkx�/W is the share of 
security k by value in that total at that time. Finally let 
m 
Cl/�
1
wi) = 
C. Using that fact that cov(Rj' Rk) = sjk/<PjPk) it is 
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straightforward to transform (25 )  into : 
CW cov(Rj , Rm) = Rj - r (26 ) 
where Rm is the rate of return on the market portfolio with initial 
value W and Rj = (gj - Pj)/Pj is the expected rate of return on 
security j. Setting Rj = Rm in equation (26 ) yields 
Rm - r = CW var(Rm) so that (26 ) becomes: 
Rj - r Pj(Rm - r)  (27 ) 
where Pj = cov(Rj ' Rm> /var(Rm) .  This relation is the classic relation 
between the expected return on a risky security , market expected 
return and riskless return in a world with no taxes under assumptions 
(Al ) - (AS ) .  Here the relation holds between pre-tax expected returns 
in the tax world . 
This result can be transformed easily into a relation between 
after-tax expected returns . Where the superscript t denotes after 
tax , the following relations hold for D = 0 :  
Rt = ( 1 - T )R  j j 
2 8  
-t Rj _ rt -t Pj<Rm - r
t ) .  (29)  
In the case where D = 0,  for each security j the after-tax risk 
premium is just (1 - T) times the before-tax risk premium. 
As has been noted , Bulow and Summers (1984 )  and Gordon (1981 ) 
reduce the basic pre-tax risk premium by (1 - T) to arrive at an 
after-tax risk premium for the tax world.  Under the CAPH in the 
simple framework here use of the (1 - T) factor is correct if one is 
relating the pre-tax and after-tax risk premia in the tax world and 
D = o. 5 But even leaving aside the cases where D F 0 ,  assessing the 
effect of taxation on corporate investment , ostensibly the goal of the 
two articles , would seem to require comparing the no tax world to the 
after-tax results in the tax world. One would expect that pre-tax 
prices in the tax world are affected by the anticipation of the taxes . 
1 .� . .  there is no reason to believe that Pj' = Pj for any given 
security j. If Pj• F Pj' then where the rate of return in the no tax 
world for asset j is Rj• = (gj - Pj')/Pj' it will be true that 
- -Rj • F Rj. Consequently, even if r' � r(l - T) , Rj - r '  will  not be 
the risk premium in the no-tax world that is to be compared with 
R� - rt, the after-tax risk premium in the tax world . 
t r = (1 - T)r (28) As discussed in section II,  we want to compare the required 
t -pj pj. 
As a result ,  an after-tax CAPH equation follows from (27 ) by 
mul tiplying both sides by (1 - T ) :  
rate of return in the no tax world to  the required pre-tax rate of 
return in the tax world. This relation is developed as equation (42 ) . 
To describe that relation it is necessary to relate no tax world risk 
premia to pre-tax risk premia in the tax world.  As  a side product , 
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the connection between no tax world risk premia and after-tax risk 
premia in the tax world will become clear. 
Deriving the relations between risk premia is straightforward 
n 
given that the term [: sjkx� in (25) is the same in both the tax and �� 
the no tax world. Letting wi' denote -ui1/2ui2 in the no tax world 
and recalling that r' is the no tax world riskless rate while Pj' is 
the no tax world price of asset j, (25) implies 
m 
(g - (1 + r')P ') j j 
fuwi' 
b1wi 
(gj - (1 + r)Pj). 
Define F as 
Now (30) can be rewritten as 
where 
a.' J 
r w . 
F= � 
b1wi 
p ., ,_J_F = aj aj p . J 
_ 5 _ (1 + r') - Pj• 
is the no tax world risk premium on asset j while 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
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!.1 - (l + r) a = P j j 
(34) 
is the pre-tax risk premium on asset j in the tax world. 
In the tax world the pre-tax riskless rate is defined as 
go - Po 
r = P so that g0 = P0(r + 1). The after-tax riskless rate is 0 
rt 
< go - Po>(l - T> 
(1 - DT)P0 
r (1 - Tl 
(1 - DT) (35) 
since the after-tax cost of investing in the riskless asset is 
(1 - DT)P0•
6 Now the overall after-tax rate of return on asset j in 
the tax world is 
rt + at j 
( g i - Pi) ( 1 - T) 
(1 - DT)Pj 
where a1 is the after-tax risk premium in the tax world. 
(35) and (36) yield 
so that from (34) 
t aj 
(1 - T) -
(1 - DT)[gj - (1 + r)Pjl/Pj 
at j 
(1 - T) 
1 - DT aj 
as established previously for the special case D = O. 
From (30), (31), and (32) it follows that 
g • (1 + r ' ) a 
_,J - j P · - (F - l)a • J j 
(36) 
Equations 
(37) 
(38) 
( 39) 
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Now using (34)  and r r ' /b(l - T) from (7 ) 
aj 
Fa1• £1 + r ' /b(l - T) ] 
1 + r '  + aj ' (l - F )  
( 40) 
so that from (38) 
at j 
Fa _1 ' ( 1 - T + r ' /b ) 
[ 1  + r '  + aj ' (l - F ) ] (l - DT ) "  
Now we can calculate Aj = (r + aj ) - (r ' 
+ aj ' ) , the 
difference between the required rate of return pre-tax in the tax 
world and the required rate of return in the no tax world. As 
( 41 ) 
discussed in part II,  the idea is that if this is small ,  there is not 
much impact of taxes on investment. Using (7 ) and (41 ) 
Aj = (r + aj ) - (r ' 
+ aj ' )  = 
r '[F - b(l- T)] , , 2 
,_r __.' l ... 1,___-_b.,_(,_,1,_,_- _ T,,.. )�1 + [ F - l 
+ 
b ( 1 - T) ] a 1 - a j ( l - F )  
b ( l  - T) 1 + r' + aj ' (l - F )  
(42 ) 
This equation is the central result of this part of the paper since it 
expresses how the required rate of return in the no tax world differs 
from the required pre-tax rate of return in the tax world . 
C. Discussion of the Results 
The difference , A., expressed in (42) depends on the J 
parameters b and F as well as on the no tax world riskless rate and 
risk premium. As indicated in equation (7 ) the parameter b connects 
the no tax world riskless rate and the pre-tax riskless rate in the 
tax world. Before discussing the implications of equation (42 ) , it is 
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important to specify the meaning of F. 
The wi • and wi that comprise F in (31 )  indicate the degree of 
individual risk aversion in an inverse way . Twice wi or twice w1• is 
simply the ratio of the marginal utility of a unit of expected return 
divided by the absolute value of the marginal disutility of a unit of 
variance . A higher wi or a higher wi ' thus indicates less risk 
aversion in the sense that at the margin the person values increases 
in expected return more highly relative to a given decrease in 
variance. In fact, the wi and wi' correspond inversely to Arrow-Pratt 
absolute risk aversion: when wi or wi ' increase (decrease ) Arrow­
Pratt absolute risk aversion decreases (increases> .7 
Defining individual "risk aversion" as u11/2Ui2 , F measures 
how average risk aversion changes between the no-tax world and the tax 
world . 8 The larger F is,  the higher average risk aversion is in the 
tax world compared to the no-tax world .  If F is greater than (less 
than) one , average risk aversion is higher (lower ) in the tax world 
than in the no tax world.  Since the wi and wi ' correspond inversely 
to Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion, they may depend on the 
individual ' s  wealth .  Under the standard assumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, the wi and wi ' increase with wealth . 
For the time being consider the case where F = 1 so that taxes 
and expenditures have not changed average risk aversion. After 
considering this case , it will be easier to discuss both the impact on 
the resul ts of F fo 1 and the wealth effects that might cause F to 
deviate from one. Let us start by examining the case F = 1 with the 
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assumption b = 1 employed by both Gordon (1981) and Bulow and Summers 
(1984). Now from (42) 
r'T r'T 4
j = � + (1 - T)(l + r')aj'· ( 43) 
From (1) and (3) it can be seen that the literature result for Aj is 
r'T/(1 - T). Careful application of the CAPH produces a second term 
that depends on the risk characteristics of the investment. In 
particular, for r' > 0 and 0 < T < 1 investments that are riskier in 
the no tax world suffer a larger increase in the required rate of 
return due to taxes. Nonetheless, the result in (43) is similar to 
Gordon's result in the sense that if r (and thus r') is assumed to be 
very small then the right hand side is close to zero. In fact, if we 
had taken b = 1/(1 - Tl when F = 1, then the right hand side would be 
exactly zero. Taxes would have no effect on investment. 
This last observation generalizes into the following 
proposition: 
Proposition!: When F = 1, then r = r' is a necessary and 
sufficient condition to insure that taxes and expenditures do not 
affect investment incentives for investments of any risk class. 
Proof: Taking r = r' is equivalent to taking b 1/(1- T). When 
b has this value and F = 1 then Aj = O regardless of aj'. Thus, 
r = r' is a sufficient condition. 
Suppose r Fr'. Then from (7) r• F O. From (42) with 
r' F 0 and b F 1/Cl - T), it is easy to choose an aj' such that 
Aj F O. Q.E.D. 
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Thus, in the case F = 1 taxes and expenditures will have no allocative 
effect on investment if and only if the taxes and expenditures result 
in a pre-tax riskless rate that is the same as the no tax riskless 
rate. Finally, note that r = 0 implies r' = 0 from (7) so that r = r' 
in that case also. 
Proposition 1 has an intuitive interpretation. When F = 1, it 
follows from (6), (7) and (30) that 
� - .L:Ll:.'.. Pj • 1 + r 
(44) 
for all j including j = O. This expression indicates that when F 
1, r = r' is a necessary and sufficient condition for Pj• = Pj. 
l·�·· r = r' ensures that security prices that correspond to any type 
of asset do not change due to taxes. As a result, if the cost of the 
physical asset remains the same, the incentive to invest remains the 
same. By buying physical assets and selling stock representing 
ownership of the assets, one will obtain the same profit or loss as 
would have been the case without taxes. Put in the parlance of 
general equilibrium investment models such as the one in Summers 
(1981), the marginal "q" (stock market value divided by replacement 
cost) for each asset is unchanged by taxes. As a result, investment 
incentives are unchanged. 
All the results so far are independent of the value of D. 
Depreciation timing can only affect the allocative impact of taxes on 
investment through b or F. But it turns out that D does affect the 
relation between after-tax and no tax risk premia even when F = 1 ,  
r '  = r and there is no allocative effect .  Aside from being 
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interesting i n  itself,  explaining the coexistence of these results is 
a building block for understanding the general results about the 
impact of depreciation timing that will follow. 
With F = 1 and r '  = r, we obtain from ( 41 )  
at j 
a ' ( 1  - T)  j 
1 - DT ( 45 ) 
Thus , the idea in Gordon ( 1981 )  that the after-tax risk premia will be 
( 1  - T) times the no tax world risk premia holds only when D = 0.  
I·�· · the government absorbs the proportion T of  the risk per after-
tax dollar invested only under a specific timing regime for 
depreciation deductions : the deductions are not taken until all the 
profits are realized and the asset is retired . In contrast, when 
D = 1 and the asset is expensed, aj = aj so that taxes do not result 
in any reduction in the risk premium per after-tax dollar of 
investment . 
When security prices remain unchanged from their no tax values 
(as they do when F = 1 and r = r ' )  and D = 0 ,  it is easy to see why 
the government "absorbs" a proportion T of the no tax world risk 
premium per after-tax dollar invested . The government is simply 
taking the proportion T of the profits and losses per after-tax dollar 
invested thus cutting both return and risk by that proportion. When 
D = 1 ,  however , the government in effect purchases a proportion T of 
the outstanding shares . Thus , it reduces price per share by ( 1  - T) 
but also takes (1 - T)  of all returns . The remaining investment has 
the same risk and return characteristics per dollar of after-tax 
investment as in the no tax world, Thus , risk premia per after-tax 
dollar invested are unaffected by taxes. This reflects the idea of 
Graetz ( 1981 ) and others that expensing with full loss offsets 
effectively makes the government a partner in each investor ' s  
operations. 
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When r '  = r and F = 1 investment incentives remain unaffected 
by taxes regardless of the value of D, and yet D determines the 
proportion of the risk premium that the government absorbs per after­
tax dollar .  This apparent paradox is easy to resolve . When D > 0, 
the government still absorbs the proportion T of the risk per �-tax 
dollar of investment . This can be verified by multiplying equations 
( 35 ) , ( 36 )  and ( 37 )  by ( 1  - DT) .  This changes rt and aj into the 
riskless rate and risk premium per �-tax dollar of investment 
respectively. Then ( 45 )  becomes 
t aj = aj ' ( l  - T) . (46) 
Thus , the government absorbs the proportion T of the risk premium per 
pre-tax dollar of investment regardless of the value of D. When D = 1 
it does so by purchasing the proportion T of each investor ' s  
portfolio.  As a result ,  the net present value of tax revenues is 
zero, as can be seen fr om ( 14) . The government is simply purchasing 
securities expected to yield the market rate of return. The purchase 
price is equal to the expected value of ownership so the net present 
value of the transaction is zero at the time of purchase . 9 When 
37  
D = 0,  given that the government adjusts its  portfolio to  eliminate 
revenue risk, it will earn a return of Tr times the total value of all 
securities . This is because the government has appropriated the 
proportion T of all end-of-period net revenues and has sold its right 
to the risky portion of those revenues at market value . End-of-period 
government revenues must be discounted by 1 + r ( l  - Tl to reflect the 
value to the public of those revenues given that the public faces an 
after-tax riskless discount rate of r ( l  - Tl . The result is exactly 
equation ( 14 l  with D 0. The present value of government revenues is 
positive (assuming r > Ol since the government has appropriated a 
proportion T of market returns without having to pay for the 
securities generating those returns . 
Now the intuitive picture can be completed for the case r '  = r 
and F = 1 .  Whether D = O or D = 1 ,  the government is taking a 
proportion T of all security returns . Since security prices do not 
change, the reduction in risk per pre-tax dollar of investment exactly 
"cancels" the reduction in return. The incentive to invest each pre-
tax dollar is thus unchanged from the no tax world .  When D 1 ,  
however , the government is paying for the returns it takes at the 
market price . This leaves the net present value of tax revenues at 
zero . When D = 0 ,  the government is not paying anything for the 
returns it takes,  and the net present value of the revenues is 
positive.  
The results so far depend on assuming r = r'  and F = 1 .  
Assuming r = r '  has some empirical justification. Since the empirical 
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evidence suggests that r :  O and since from ( 7 l  r '  i s  proportional to 
r ,  it is not unreasonable to assume that both r and r '  are zero. 
Consider , however, the case where r I 0 and r '  I r . Then D will have 
an impact on investment incentives through its impact on b .  This is 
best illustrated with an example. Suppose that the taxed investment 
sector is small compared to the total set of available investments.  
Then it is reasonable to assume that rt = r ' .  !.� . . the after-tax 
riskless rate will be equal to the no tax world riskless rate , and 
both rt and r '  will be equal to the riskless rate prevailing outside 
of the taxed investment sector . As the argument in Summers ( 1981 l 
suggests ,  this is a nontrivial case . In studying corporate taxes in 
that paper Summers takes the required after-tax rate of return on U . S. 
corporate investment to be fixed given the availability of a large 
pool of noncorporate inve$tments and foreign investments . 
Using ( 7 )  and ( 3 S l  rt = r '  implies 
b = 1 _!- DT ' ( 47 l 
From this expression and ( 7 l  it is clear that r moves inversely with 
D .  From ( 30l it follows that 
�1 liD F 1 ,  rt > o .  ( 48l r' 
Since b = 1/ (1  - Tl . rt = r• = r and Pj = Pj ' when D = 1 and F = 1 ,  
P
j < Pj ' when D < 1 and I Pj - Pj ' I increases as D fal ls from one . 
Thus , more rapid depreciation allowances (a  higher Dl stimulate 
investment by lowering the pre-tax riskless rate . This raises 
security prices and thus marginal q .  
Using equation ( 44 )  the effects of changes in D can be 
generalized beyond the case rt = r '  to yield the following 
proposition. 
Proposition i .  When F = 1 ,  an  across-the-board change in  D 
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decreases (increases )  security prices i f  and only if i t  increases 
(decreases ) r .  
Assuming rt = r simply allows us t o  specify through equation ( 47 )  
exactly the impact of D o n  r .  
We have seen that the conventionally expected effects of the 
timing of depreciation allowances on investment incentives will occur 
if the pre-tax riskless rate falls when the allowances are 
accelerated . Other effects of that timing can occur if the timing 
affects the value of F .  It  is  convenient to explore the determinants 
and the effect of F generally rather than focusing only on how D may 
affect investment incentives through F .  
The possibility that F fo 1 raises several questions . First,  
how sensitive are the results to deviations from F = 17 Second , if 
there is some sensitivity , how would the condition F = 1 emerge from 
individual preferences and government behavior and is that condition 
plausible? Finally, if the deviation of F from one affects the 
resul ts , how would that deviation come about? 
To answer the first question, consider the effect of F on 
Aj s (r + aj ) - (r ' + aj ' ) ,  the gap between the required pre-tax rate 
of return and the required no tax world rate of return:  
40 
( 1  + r '  + a ' ) a ' b(l - T) + (a 1 ) 2r •  + r ' a  ' + (r 1 ) 2a • 
� aF 
j j j j 1 
b(l - T) [ l  + r '  + aJ ' (l - F ) ]
2 ( 49) 
For the empirically plausible case where r' : O, this simplifies to 
� 1 _ ( 1  + a1 • > a1 • aF r I = 0 - [ 1 + a. I ( 1 - F ) ]  2 • J 
In the range 0 i F i  2 this derivative is approximately aj ' for 
0 < aj ' < <  1 .  Since Aj = O when r '  = 0 and F = 1 ,  we can take 
A - (F - l) a ' j - J 
( 50) 
( 51 ) 
for r '  = 0 ,  0 < aj ' << 1 and 0 i F i 2 .  This sensitivity to F is high 
enough to make exploration of the causes and potential extent of 
deviations of F from 1 worth considering . 
Taxes and expenditures may impact on F through two kinds of 
wealth effects .  First , security prices may change from the no tax 
world to the tax world thereby affecting the value of individuals '  
endowments . Second , as a result of taxes , the government in effect 
has removed weal th in amount G from the economy at the beginning of 
the period.  This is the net present value of government expenditures 
other than expenditure to cover beginning-of-period depreciation 
allowances . The government spends G to the benefit of individuals,  
and this is represented by individual i receiving a lump sum amount 
EdiG at the beginning of the period . If E, the effectiveness of 
government expenditure, is greater than (less than) one ,  then in 
aggregate wealth increases (decreases )  at the beginning of the period . 
Now suppose that taxes cause security prices to increase or 
that government expenditures are more effective than private 
expenditures. The increase in wealth would tend to decrease average 
risk aversion so that F < 1 results . For simplicity assume that 
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r = r ' .  Then from (6) and ( 7 )  P0 = l ,  and the riskless security has 
the same price in the tax world as in the no tax world. From equation 
( 30) , it is clear that Pj > Pj ' and that Pj - Pj ' is larger for 
securities carrying larger risk premiums ( in either the tax or the no 
tax world) .  This makes sense . The decrease in average risk aversion 
means that risky assets must increase in price for the market to clear 
and the increase must be greater the riskier the asset .  As  a resul t ,  
the tendency o f  the absorption of risk by the government t o  reduce 
required pre-tax return is augmented by the reduction in risk premia 
due to the reduction in average risk aversion. In the extreme case , 
F = O so that the market prices assets as if the average person was 
risk neutral . Taking for simplicity r = r '  = 0 ,  equation ( 42 )  then 
yields aj - aj ' = -aj ' .  l·� · · the tax world risk premia aj ( and also 
al > are zero for all assets since individuals have become risk 
neutral . 
Is it reasonable to assume F = 1? This assumption implies 
either that individual risk aversion is unresponsive to wealth or that 
changes in risk aversion tend to cancel out on average . The former 
possibility is ruled out under the standard assumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. 10  The latter possibility is not implausible 
when E = 1 and r is close to r ' . By equation ( 44)  if r = r '  and 
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F = 1 ,  security prices do not change so that no wealth effects arise 
from the revaluation of endowments . When E = 1 ,  the present value of 
net tax payments is simply redistributed with none lost . This 
corresponds to the marginal expenditures of a rational government : 
the value of the expenditures ( less all costs including administrative 
costs )  is exactly the value of leaving the money in the private 
sector . This redistribution may change the distribution of wealth in 
society , but the gains of winners will exactly offset the losses of 
losers. If everyone has risk aversion that decreases with weal th ,  
wi > wi ' will hold for winners , but wi < wi ' will hold for loser s .  
m m 
Therefore }" wi might end up being about the same as }" wi ' .  /;;1 /;;1 
Only if the redistribution is systematically in favor of those 
with risk aversion particularly responsive or particularly 
unresponsive to wealth will deviations of F from 1 assume potential 
importance . There is no obvious assumption to make about how the 
responsiveness of wi to wealth varies with wealth or with the initial 
value of wi .
11 Under the circumstances CE = 1 ,  r '  = r) , it may not be 
unreasonable to assume that F = 1 .  Another way to reach this result 
is the assumption that r and r ' are close to zero . Then the net 
present value of government revenues is small and any wealth effects 
due to anticipated government expenditures can be ignored independent 
of the value of E. 
In summary, it is clear that the conclusion in Gordon ( 1981 ) 
that income taxes have negligible effects on investment holds up in a 
CAPH framework in at least one empirically plausible environment . 
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That is where both r and r '  are close to zero. In that situation 
there is no free lunch since by equation ( 14)  the net present value of 
government receipts will be close to zero. Where r and r'  are 
significantly greater than zero so that the net present value of 
government revenues is nontrivial , more complicated conditions are 
required to reach Gordon' s  result .  For example , r '  = r and E = 1 is 
an environment where Gordon 's  result is believable. But it is unclear 
why r '  = r would hold .  The argument in Summers ( 1981 ) , for example ,  
would suggest that rt = r '  i s  a reasonable assumption i f  the after-tax 
riskless rate in the taxed sector must equal the riskless rate in a 
much larger untaxed or foreign sector . But from ( 35) rt = r only when 
D = 1 .  More generally (when r '  F r  or E F 1 ) , wealth effects arising 
through either the revaluation of endowments due to taxes or the 
pattern of expenditure may cause investment incentives to change in 
either direction. At the same time, the net present value of tax 
revenues will depend solely on the pre-tax riskless rate , the tax rate 
and the timing of depreciation deductions . 
There remains the task of determining whether these results 
would be different if a distinction were drawn between capital risk 
and income risk as in Bulow and Summers ( 1 984) . That is the task of 
the next part . 
IV . CAPITAL RISK VERSUS INCOME RISK: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE TAX 
TREATMENT OF ASSET SALES 
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When a capital asset is purchased, there are two main 
possibilities for its use . First,  the asset may be retained until it 
is worthless at which point it will be discarded. This possibility 
includes the case where the owner leases the asset for use by others 
during part or all of its life .  Second, it may at some point become 
more profitable to sell the asset .  This possibility includes sale of 
the asset for scrap when no one can continue to use it profitably . 
In advance, the owner may not know which case will prevail . 
The discounted present value of the asset at the time of investment 
will include the possibility that the asset will be sold at certain 
times in the future . Rather than explicitly modelling the decision to 
sell or retain the asset , we will look at the consequences of sale and 
retention separately. This approach suffices to describe the 
circumstances under which the effects that Bulow and Summers describe 
will take place . 
We will proceed by considering a simple paradigmatic asset 
investment in a discrete time framework. For convenience , any sale of 
the asset will take place at "time l "  exactly one period after 
purchase at "time O . "  The asset will have the following 
characteristics : 
X :  time 0 cost of the asset;  
Y : total revenues net of all costs except depreciation -- all 
of those revenues are assumed to be received at time 1 ;  
Z :  sale value of the asset at time 1 .  
The expected values of Y and Z ar e  denoted Ye and ze respectively. 
A tax at a single rate T will be levied on both operating 
income and on gains and losses from sales . Thus , there will be no 
special capital gains rate on asset sales versus the ordinary income 
rate on operating income. Under current U . S .  tax l aw ,  this is a 
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reasonable assumption for assets that decline substantially in value 
with use . 12  As in section III, the tax will be a single-level tax and 
the tax rate is independent of the taxpayer ' s  income . This tax can be 
thought of as the corporate tax and appropriately so, since much of 
the depreciable capital stock is held by corporations . Another 
assumption shared with section III is full loss offsets . Thus , any 
deductions can be used immediately at a value of T per dollar of 
deduction . This avoids the complexities modelled in Auerbach ( 1983 ) 
of assessing the impact of the possible postponement of the benefit of 
deductions . Finally, following Bulow and Summers ( 1984) inflation is 
ignored . 
The following assumptions and notation for discount rates 
shall be used : 
r ' :  riskless rate in the no tax world and after-tax riskless 
rate in the tax world ;  
a' : risk premium for the revenue stream Y or any portion of it 
in the tax and no tax worlds ; 
c ' :  risk premium for the sale value Z or any portion of it in 
the tax and no tax worlds . 
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F.quality of the no tax world riskless rate and the after-tax riskless 
rate in the tax world simply follows the assumptions in Gordon ( 1 981 ) 
and Bulow and Summers ( 1 984) . In the framework of the previous 
section, taking the discount rates a '  and c '  to be invariant to the 
tax structure is equivalent to assuming F = 1 .  I·�· , taxes do not 
affect average risk aversion so that market risk premia for any given 
risky stream remain the same. 
There are three situations to consider : 
A :  the asset i s  retained until it i s  worthless at time 1 ;  
B :  the asset is sold at time 1 before i t  is worthless and the 
sale results in a tax on gain or in a deductible loss;  
C :  the asset is sold before it  is worthless and the sale has no 
tax consequences .  
In each situation w e  want to compare the required pre-tax expected 
rate of return to the no tax world expected rate of return.  In  
situation j let  NPVj be the net present value at  time O of  the 
t investment in the no tax world and NPVj be the after-tax net present 
value at time 0 of the investment in the tax world. Now, given that 
Z = Ze = O in situation A, define for situation j : 
- z
e + ye - x 
I -
ze + ye - x i Aj X X 
NPV� = 0 NPVj = 0 
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( 53 ) 
where Aj is the difference between the required pre-tax rate of return 
in the tax world and the required no tax world rate of return. 
To test Bulow and Summers ' claims , tax depreciation will be 
set at the expected decline in asset value from time 0 to time 1 .  
This is the amount that they suggest is inadequate because it does not 
take into account capital risk.  Furthermore ,  the entire depreciation 
deduction will be allowed at time 1 .  This simplifies the 
computations , and no change in the qualitative results would occur if 
some other timing regime were used.  
and 
In situation A ze = Z = 0 so that 
NPVA 
NPVt A 
Y
e 
-X + 1 + r '  + a •  
-X + Y
e(l - T) + __:rx__ 1 + r '  + a '  1 + r '  • 
The third term on the right hand side of ( 55 )  reflects the present 
( 54) 
( 55 )  
value at  time 0 of the depreciation deduction of X allowed at time 1 .  
Some arithmetic yields 
and 
L_xl -X NPV A = 0 r '  + a '  ( 56 ) 
:C__::__x l X NPVt = O  A (1 + r '  - T)a '  + _r_• _ ( 1  + r ' ) ( l  - T) 1 - T 
so that 
_ � r ' Ta'  Aj - 1 - T + (1  + r ' ) ( l  - T) " 
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( 57 ) 
( 58) 
Comparing equation ( 43 ) ,  this is exactly the result we obtain in the 
asset pricing model in section III when F = 1 and b = l ,  the 
assumptions of this section. 13 Assuming r '  is negligible,  Aj is 
negligible and taxes have very little impact on investment behavior . 
and 
In situation B 
NPVB 
NPVt B 
e e 
-x + ��----�� + _____z..::. 1 + r '  + a' 1 + r '  + c '  
e e 
-X + Y ( 1 - T) + Z ( 1 - T) + ___'!X_ 1 + r '  + a '  1 + r '  + c '  1 + r' • 
( 59) 
( 60) 
The fourth term on the right hand side of ( 60) reflects the fact that 
the total cost of the asset will be deducted for certain at time 1 
either as a depreciation deduction or as basis in computing gain on 
sale of the asset. Now we have 
ze + ye _ X , 
NPVB = 0 
r '  + a '  
and 
Z..:. c '  - a'  
+ X 1 + r '  + c '  ( 61 ) 
e ye - X I z + t X NPVB 
so that 
0 
(1 + r' - T) a' r' .Z.: c ' - a' 
(1 + r') (1 - Tl + (1 - Tl + X 1 + r' + c' 
r'T r'Ta' AB = AA = � + (1 + r')(l T) " 
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( 62 )  
( 63 )  
Thus, the existence of capital risk as well as income risk does not 
change the outcome if sales of assets are taxed. This makes sense. 
Comparing NPV� in ( 60 )  to NPVi in ( SS ) , effectively all we have done 
is to split the income stream into two components with different risk 
premia. Distinguishing income risk and capital risk involves nothing 
else if income from the sale of assets is taxed at the same rate as 
income from operations. 
NPVC is the same as NPVB and we have 
NPVt c 
e e e 
-X + Y ( 1 - T) + Z + TCX - Z ) 1 + r' + a' 1 + r' + c' 1 + r• (64) 
where the final term on the right hand side allows for a depreciation 
deduction of X - ze, the expected decline in asset value. Now 
ze + ye 
x 
-
x i t NPVC 
and using (61) 
0 
(1 + r' - T)a' 
(1 + r')(l - T) 
r' + � 
Z.:[ c '  - a' Ta' + X (1 - T)(l + r' + c') + (1 + r')(l - T)] < 6 S l 
so 
r 'T r 'Ta' .Z.: Tc' ( 1 + r '  + a ' l Ac = 1 - T + ( 1 + r • ) ( 1 - Tl + X ( 1 + r' > < 1 + r' + c') ( 1 - Tl· ( 66 )  
This is the type of result that Bulow and Summers have in 
mind. For sufficiently large T and an asset expected to have a 
significant value at sale compared to original cost, the last term is 
on the order of c ' .  But c '  is the capital risk premium that Bulow and 
Summers argue is large compared to r' or even a' . As a result, the 
required pre-tax rate of return will be significantly larger than the 
required no tax world rate of return, and taxes will significantly 
burden investment .  The reason for this outcome is easy to see. 
Because total depreciation deductions at time 1 equal the expected 
decline in asset value, the undeducted costs equal expected asset 
value. Taxing the sale produces a risky loss in return at time 1 with 
expected value -'l'Ze but a certain deduction with time 1 value of TZe. 
If the risk premium is nontrivial, the investor is better off if the 
sale is taxed. From the ex ante time 0 perspective, taxation results 
in valuable risk reduction with no loss in expected return. 
In summary, the effects claimed in Bulow and Summers (1984)  
arise only when used asset sales have no tax consequences. That tax 
treatment would be an anomaly under current U.S. tax law. Not only do 
depreciable asset sales receive ordinary income and loss treatment for 
the most part,14 but there are special provisions in the tax code and 
administrative regulations that prevent evasion of tax when assets are 
disposed of through liquidations or distributions that would otherwise 
be tax free.l s 
Sl 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The provocative argument in Gordon ( 1 981 ) that offseting 
effects on risk and return may make capital income taxes largely 
nondistorting must be taken seriously. Section III shows that 
argument to be plausible in an asset pricing model with government 
expenditure as long as one makes the empirically believable assumption 
that the pre-tax riskless rate of return in the tax world is  
negligible .  Furthermore ,  the failure to  add a premium for "capital 
risk" to the standard economic depreciation allowance based on 
expected decline in asset value does not change that result unless the 
income tax system has the pathology of allowing used asset sales to be 
tax free. The current U . S .  tax system seems to be free of that 
pathology . 
• 
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Work on this paper was supported by University of Southern 
California Law Center summer research grants in 1 983 and 1984 . 
Background computations useful to the development of the theory 
here were performed using equipment contributed by the I . B.M .  
Corporation. I have benefited from extensive comments by Roberta 
Romano, Alan Schwartz , Jim Snyder ,  Dan Spulber and participants 
in USC ' s  Seminar on Applied Economics and Public Policy , 
Discussions with Joe Bankman, Tom Griffith and Norman Lane also 
have been helpful . Any remaining errors are my own 
responsibility .  
1 .  These assumptions greatly simplify the model . Including tax 
rates that differ among individuals ,  for example ,  requires that 
somewhat arbitrary restrictions on short sales and borrowing be 
included in the model . Schaefer ( 1 976) shows that otherwise 
there may be no equilibrium because of unlimited opportunities 
for arbitrage . Sometimes it is necessary to include such 
restrictions in a model . Auerbach and King ( 1983 ) , for example ,  
introduce short sale and borrowing restrictions in the Brennan 
( 1 970)  framework in order to study issues such as how portfolio 
composition varies according to tax bracket.  
2 .  If there were a perfect correlation between two different linear 
combinations of securities, Q could be made free of risk without 
3 .  
4 .  
setting all the coefficients of gj in ( 10 )  to zero. But this 
situation corresponds to the case where there is at least one 
redundant security . By relabeling securities the set can be 
reduced to one where no distinct linear combinations of 
securities are perfectly correlated. The statement in the text 
presumes that has been done . This assumption, equivalent to 
assuming that the covariance matrix for risky securities is 
nonsingular, is convenient for the development of theory in a 
CAPH framework. See, for example ,  Long ( 1977 )  and Roll ( 1977 ) . 
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In equation ( 15 )  gj ( l  - T) is the after-tax value of the expected 
revenues gj while (1 - D )TPj is the after-tax value of the end­
of-period deduction in the amount ( 1  - D ) Pj . See assumption 
(A7 ) . The term [r ( l  - T) + ( 1  - DT ) l P0 is equivalent to 
g0C 1  - T> + ( 1  - D ) TP0 since g0 = ( 1  + r ) P0 • 
Following Brennan ( 1 970) , this analysis assumes that the second 
order conditions for a maximum are satisfied . That assumption is 
warranted if investors are assumed to be risk averse since the 
after-tax mean variance frontier will be concave (as long as the 
tax rate is not regressive over some range -- here it is 
constant ) .  See Litzenberger and Ramaswamy ( 1 97 9) . 
5 .  Litzenberger and Ramaswamy ( 197 9)  obtain a relation like ( 2 9) as 
the marke t equilibrium in a more complex model that includes 
income-related constraints on borrowing . 
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
The numerator Cg0 - P0) ( 1 - T )  in ( 3 5 )  is simply the after-tax 
return g0 ( 1  - T) + ( 1  - D ) TP0 • see note 3 ,  minus the after-tax 
cost ( 1  - DT> P0 • 
It is straightforward but tedious to relate wi ( or wi ' )  to 
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion. Given assumptions ( Al )  and 
• 
( A2 )  we have some Ui ( Zi) where Zi is person i ' s  wealth and 
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- 2 • Ui ( vi ' Si ) = EUi(Zi) where E is the expectation operator over the 
distribution of wealth outcomes at the end of the period . ( Since 
each individual selects a portfolio of securities that are 
distributed multivariate normal , end-of-period wealth will be 
normally distributed . )  Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion is 
• • Ai = -Ui ' ' /Ui ' where primes denote derivatives with respect to 
wealth . It is straightforward to show that when Ai decreases 
(increases )  in weal th , wi increases (decreases )  with wealth .  
J .�  . .  changes in  wi correspond inversely to  changes in absolute 
risk aversion. This is intuitively clear since wi is 
proportional to the marginal trade-off between mean and variance , 
and thus would measure willingness to engage in any given 
marginal gamble .  
Note that o11/2oi2 is -wi or -wi ' .  Thus, this measure of 
individual risk aversion increases when the individual is more 
risk averse in the usual sense of the term. 
Since there are no limitations on short sales and no gap 
between the rates at which individuals can borrow ( sell short) 
9 .  
S S  
and lend ( invest)  in this model, in equilibrium every investor 
will have the same wi or wi ' .  Therefore, F can b e  conceptualized 
as the change in everyone 's common marginal rate of substitution 
between risk and return. But it is convenient to refer to F as 
expressing a change in average risk aversion. 
This would not be the case if some of the taxed assets were 
expected to yield greater than the market rate of return. Then 
the government as co-owner would obtain the proportion T of the 
value generated at the time of investment due to the expected 
return being greater than market rates. This result makes 
expensing the treatment that corresponds to the Haig-Simons ideal 
for an income tax: the government is taxing away the proportion 
T of the increase in wealth due to an investment expected to 
yield greater than market rates of return. That "tax" occurs 
exactly at the time when the wealth increases. This result that 
expensing results in Haig-Simons treatment at the statutory rate 
T is completely the opposite of the conventional wisdom that 
expensing corresponds to a zero tax rate income tax and is a form 
of a consumption tax. The result here depends on the assumptions 
F = 1 and r '  = r. But it seems clear that the conventional 
wisdom is mistaken. For an extensive discussion see Strnad 
( 1 984) . 
The model in the present paper is of a perfectly competitive 
securities market. There are no investments available that 
produce greater than the market rate of return. As a result, the 
S6 
possibility that there will be investment opportunities yielding 
an increase in wealth at the time of investment is excluded. 
1 0 .  In addition, there are technical problems with assuming constant 
risk aversion. In a mean-variance portfolio model such as the 
one in this paper, a sufficient condition for wi to be constant 
is that individuals have utility functions of the form 
- 2 - 2 Ui( vi ' Si) = ai + bvi - cSi where the ai ' b and c are constants. 
The condition is in a sense also a necessary condition. Without 
this condition wi will in general vary with wealth since wealth 
- 2 changes will affect the vi and Si of each individual 's  chosen 
portfolio. 
- 2 However, utility functions linear in vi and Si are not 
possible under assumptions (Al) and (A2 ) . If Ui (;i' si> is the 
expected value of a von-Neuman-Horgenstern utility function, 
• Ui ( Zi) '  where Zi is person i 's  wealth and securities are 
distributed multivariate normal, then it is well known that U .  i 
must obey the following partial differential equation : 
ilUi 
2-
ilS� i 
a2u 
- _ _  i 
aV2 i 
( S2 ) 
2 - 2 See Baron ( 1977 ) . When U . ( v., S.) is linear in vi and Si with a i i i 
nonzero coefficient on s� . ( S2 )  is not satisified. i 
11 . How the responsiveness of absolute risk aversion to wealth varies 
with wealth, for example, depends on the sign of the second 
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derivative of absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth .  But 
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a result ,  ordinary income and ordinary loss treatment can be 
from the expression for absolute risk aversion in note 7 ,  it is taken to be the usual treatment on sale of a depreciable asset . 
clear that the sign of its second derivative depends on the signs 
of the third and fourth derivatives of the utility function. It 
is hard to make an intuitive judgment as to what these signs are 
and how they vary with weal th .  
12 . Suppose that a depreciable asset is purchased for an amount A ,  
depreciation deductions totalling B have been taken on the asset , 
and the asset has current value V .  The "adjusted basis" of the 
asset is thus C = A - B. I-�· · the adjusted basis is the portion 
of original cost not yet deducted . Except for a few special 
kinds of real property (primarily low-income housing and 
residential rental structures )  the tax treatment under current 
U . S. law is roughly as follows (with reference to the appropriate 
Internal Revenue Code sections ) : 
( 1 ) V < C :  an ordinary loss under section 1231 i n  the 
amount C - V ;  
( 2 )  A > V > C :  ordinary income under section 1245 i n  the 
amount V - C ;  
( 3 ) V > A :  ordinary income under section 1245 in the 
amount A - C and capital gains income in the amount V - A. 
For assets that decline substantially in value with use ( 3 )  is 
unlikely to occur unless inflation rates are extremely high . As 
13 . We can also verify that in the case F = 1 and b = 1 it is correct 
to use the same risk premium in discounting to present value as 
in the no tax world despite the fact apparent from ( 40) and ( 41 )  
that this risk premium differs from both the after-tax risk 
premium and the pre-tax risk premium in the tax world .  Equation 
( 57 )  indicates that use of the no tax world risk premium in 
discounting yields ( 1  + r '  - T) a ' / [ ( 1  + r ' ) ( l - T ) ]  as a pre-tax 
risk premium and r '/ ( 1 - Tl as a pre-tax riskless rate in the tax 
world.  By equations ( 7 )  and ( 40 )  these are correct for the case 
F = 1 and b = 1 .  
14 .  See note 1 2 .  
1 5 .  Section 311 (a ) ( 2 )  o f  the Internal Revenue Code allows a 
corporation to ignore gains and losses for tax purposes when it 
distributes property with respect to its stock . Section 337 and 
( prior to 1 982 ) section 336 allow corporate liquidations to be 
tax free in certain situations . These sections raise the 
possibility of "selling" an asset without any tax consequences. 
Treasury regulation 1 . 245-6 ( b ) , however , causes the corporation 
to realize gain equal to the amount by which value exceeds 
adjusted basis up to original cost less adjusted basis . Also , in 
1 984 Congress amended section 311 ( d ) ( l )  to reverse the rule of 
section 3ll (a ) ( 2 )  in the case of appreciated property . A 
59  
corporation recognizes gain when it distributes such property 
with respect to its stock, and the gain recognized is not limited 
to original cost less adjusted basis .  
I n  a system ( such as the current U . S. system) where 
depreciation allowances are at a much faster rate than expected 
decline in asset value , most depreciable assets have original 
cost > value > adjusted basis.  See note 1 2 .  Thus , Treasury 
regulation 1 . 245-6 ( b )  by itself insures that use of tax-free 
distributions and liquidations usually will not change the tax 
consequences that would result from direct sale of a depreciable 
asset.  
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APPENDIX : 
Gordon' s  Two-Period Consumption Model 
At the core of his paper, Gordon ( 1981 ) does not use the CAPH 
but uses a two-period consumption model . Individual i maximizes 
expected utility over C� and c� . consumption by i in periods 1 and 2 
respectively.  All after-tax return from investment is consumed in 
period 2.  There are j firms that each invest in capital with a cost 
Kj in period 1 and a value Vj at that time . Individual i initially 
owns xij of firm j and that individual receives that proportion of the 
initial surplus , Vj - Kj . After some first period trading individual 
i emerges owning xij of firm j .  The period 2 before-tax return in 
excess of capital costs for firm j is Nj . Nj is uncertain.  
Gordon has five kinds of taxes in his model : a property tax, 
a tax at the corporate level , a tax on earnings from corporate equity , 
a tax on earnings from lending at the riskless rate , and a tax on 
inflationary gains. To make his results comparable to those in this 
paper , I simplify his model by assuming no inflation, no tax at the 
corporate level , no property tax, and a common tax at rate e on 
earnings from corporate equity and on earnings from lending at the 
riskless rate . 
Gordon ' s  model also includes government expenditure effects .  
The government distributes all of the taxes i t  has collected to 
individuals .  Each individual i receives a distribution Yi i n  the 
second period , the same period when the individual pays taxes on his 
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or her earnings from capital . Gordon specifies that the distributions 
are lump sum. However, in proving his main resul t ,  Gordon implicitly 
assumes that individuals foresee the values of Yi since they use these 
values in maximizing their expected utilities. Gordon argues that if 
transfers are set at a level so that C� and the distribution of C� are 
unchanged from the no tax world for all individuals i ,  then each 
individual i will have the same expected utility and derivatives 
thereof in the tax world as in the no tax world. ( This follows from 
the fact that for each individual i utility and its derivatives are 
functions of C� and C� only ) . But in order for this to be true , each 
individual must anticipate the transfer Yi ' its distribution, and how 
its distribution relates to the taxes that i will pay . Thus , Gordon' s  
model i s  like the case of gover11111ent expenditure effects i n  section 
III : each individual knows in advance how the gover111Dent 
distributions to him or her will depend on the outcomes of the 
investments in the world .  
Gordon 's  main result i n  the simplified context here i s  that an 
income tax system will not have any effect on equilibrium values of 
the C� and Kj or on the distribution of C� if the following two 
conditions are met : 
( 1 )  re = o 
J 
( 2 ) Yi = e;1 [ ( Vj - Kj ) (xij - xij ) + xij ( Nj - rKj ) ]  
where r is the no tax world return on the riskless asset and there are 
J firms . Condition ( 1 )  says that either r or e is zero. The case 
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where e is zero is trivial since there are no taxes in a world where 
e = O is the tax rate on income from captial and that is the only tax. 
Consider the case r = O .  Now ( 2) becomes :  
J 
( 2 , ) Yi = e �1 c c vj - Kj) (xij - xij) + xijNj] .  
Consider the two cases for an asset j held by i :  xij = 0 and xij F O .  
Now for iij = O ,  the term in the square brackets i n  ( 2 ' )  i s  just the 
profit realized by i by buying xij of firm j in period 1 .  xijNj is 
i ' s  share of the profit of firm j above the firm ' s  cost Kj . But 
investor i paid xijvj not xijKj for xij of firm j .  As a resul t ,  
xij ( Vj - Kj ) must be subtracted from xijNj to yield i ' s profits from 
buying xij of firm j . 
The analysis is the same when xij 
F O except that there is an 
additional term in the square brackets in ( 2 ' ) . This is xij ( Vj - Kj ) .  
But that term is equal to the initial gain that i realized by owning 
xij of firm j .  Thus , the sum of the square bracket terms i s  the total 
income in both periods of person i from all of his or her investments 
in risky a.Ssets . Gordon shows in his equation ( 20a) that r = 0 
implies that the tax world riskless rate is zero . Thus , there is no 
income from riskless investments . Furthermore,  since individuals can 
borrow and lend without restriction in the model at this zero rate , 
income and transfers from different periods can properly be compared 
without discounting to allow for the time value of money . As a 
resul t,  the transfer Yi is equivalent to a transfer of all taxes paid 
by i on that income back to i .  
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There is one subtlety in asserting this equivalence . Part of 
the taxation of profits occurs through price adjustments in Gordo n ' s  
model . In particular , from his equation ( 20b) 
• • Vj = Kj + ( 1  - e ) ( Vj - Kj ) where Vj is the initial value of firm j in 
the tax world . It is easy to see that this change in prices "taxes" 
initial owners who sell in the first period at exactly the rate e 
since their proceeds are reduced by e (Vj - Kj ) from those in the no 
tax world.  
• 
It is also the case that the adjustment of Vj to vj 
provides 
the "proper" tax treatment of those who buy shares in the initial 
period. In Gordon's  model , individuals who buy part of firm j do not 
get to deduct their cost but only their share of the firm ' s  capital 
cost . I.� . . if individual i buys xij of firm j ,  then in period two 
that individual will pay eNj in taxes where Nj is firm j ' s  return over 
and above the capital cost Kj . Individual i ' s  profit , however, is the 
excess of the firm ' s  value in period two over Vj ' its value in period 
• 
one . But Vj - Vj = e ( Vj - Kj ) so that the price that i has to pay is 
reduced by exactly the taxes on Vj - Kj . This compensates for being 
given a basis Kj instead of the actual cost Vj . With a zero after-tax 
riskless rate and unlimited borrowing and lending permitted with zero 
transactions costs at that rate, the compensation is exact . The 
• 
individual is indifferent between paying vj instead of vj in the first 
period and having a basis of Vj instead of Kj for computing gains in 
the second period. 
In summary, when the after-tax riskless rate is zero, the set 
• 
of prices and taxes is equivalent to setting Vj = Vj and taxing all 
profits on investments in the traditional way ( respecting basis as 
cost ) including the gains from sales by original owners.  In fact , 
• 
with Vj = Vj and taxes set that way, the same equilibrium values of 
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C� , Kj and the same equilibrium distribution of ci would obtain in the 
no tax world as in the tax world. The taxes on profits would be 
exactly returned by the transfers Yi . 
Thus , when Gordon 's  model is simplified to include a single-
level tax with no inflation and that tax is made to conform to the 
conventions currently used in income taxation, each taxpayer is given 
transfers that refund the taxes paid.  Since the after-tax riskless 
rate is zero, the timing of the transfers does not matter . It is as 
if each person were instantaneously given a full refund of taxes at 
the time of payment . It is not surprising that where all taxes are 
transferred back to taxpayers and they know this will happen, the 
equilibrium in the tax world will be the same as in the no tax world .  
Individuals will behave as i f  there are no taxes . 
